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Abstract: According to theoretical and empirical evidence young workers are more likely to be 
overeducated than adult ones, especially in countries where the educational attainments of young 
people grow quickly and the school-to-work transition is difficult and/or lengthy. 
Nonetheless, if overeducation were expected to disappear during working life, it would not be a 
crucial  problem. 
To test the transitory nature/persistence of this phenomenon, firstly, I estimated overeducation using 
the competences frontier method and, later, I studied the “destination” of different cohorts of 
workers by applying a pseudo-panel technique to Eurostat data referring to European Mediterranean 
countries and the Netherlands. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last few decades European Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Italy, Spain and 
Greece, the so-called “P.I.G.S.” countries1) have been characterised by fast growth in educational 
attainments of the population and difficulties in integrating young people into the labour markets. 
Both these characteristics could generate problems of overeducation for the youngest cohorts of 
workers.  
In this framework, we should clarify if the rapid growth in the average level of education has 
been driven by an effective requirement for a more highly educated workforce (from the labour-
demand side point of view), or if it has been the result of a simple “supply effect”2. In the former 
case the growth of educational attainments would reflect the necessity for workers (and firms) to 
adapt to incessant technological and organizational changes in a dynamic labour market, whilst in 
the latter case it would be the outcome of autonomous decisions to invest in human capital taken by 
individuals and families. Such being the case, the educational system and the production system 
                                                 
1
 . The Economist,  June 5, 2008,  “The ECB at ten: A decade in the sun”. 
2
 . See Frey, Ghignoni and Livraghi, 1998, and related bibliography. 
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dynamics could be largely independent from each other
3
, and labour demand would just draw the 
newly hired workers from a population where highly educated individuals are becoming more and 
more numerous. Obviously, if the “supply effect” exceeds the “demand effect”, overeducation 
emerges and it would affect, above all, the more educated young workers. 
In addition, part of the literature points out the link between overeducation and labour market 
characteristics at local level
4
. In this framework, the incidental difficulty of young people entering 
the local labour market could worsen the problem of young workers‟ overeducation.  In particular, a 
local labour market characterised by high youth unemployment rates and a difficult and lengthy 
school-to-work transition, could induce (well-educated) young people to settle for jobs not fitting 
their level of education. Moreover, in this situation it would be easier for employers to re-categorize 
jobs as requiring a degree, when they were previously filled by non-graduates, without altering the 
pay scale accordingly (Di Pietro and Urwin, 2006). 
The main idea of this paper is that, even in countries where young people find it difficult to enter 
the labour market, overeducation should be a persistent phenomenon only if the growth in 
education level of the labour force is greater than the growth of the educational quality of jobs  
(Groot, 1996), that is, only in those cases where the growth in the educational attainments of the 
population is due to a supply-side effect, rather than a demand-side effect. 
A highly-skilled demanding local labour market, by providing good jobs and career 
opportunities, should reduce the risks of permanent overeducation. In this case individuals‟ 
overeducation might be higher for younger workers, due to difficult entry conditions, but it should 
diminish during working life as workers move along their career paths
5
. Thus, we should expect 
that different cohorts of individuals will have experienced overeducation, at the most, at the 
beginning of their working life, and that overeducation shows a progressive reduction, as different 
cohorts move to more demanding jobs in which they make full use of their qualifications. 
This paper aims to analyse how these elements (supply or demand-driven growth of education in 
the labour force and marginalization/integration of young people in the labour market) interacted in 
determining youth overeducation and the evolution of overeducation for the youngest cohort of 
workers in Mediterranean countries and in the Netherlands. 
                                                 
3
 . For example, Carnoy and Levin, 1985, show that the evolution of the educational system in the USA would be 
characterised not only by the attempt to match workers‟ human capital to firms‟ needs but, above all, to meet the need 
of assuring equal opportunities to individuals. 
4
 . Part of this literature is linked to workers‟ limited spatial mobility. If their job seeking takes place at local level they 
will be exposed to higher risks of overeducation. This may be the case, in particular, of married women in a gender 
segmented labour market (Frank, 1978). Generally, it does not seem to be the case of young workers. 
5
. Sicherman, 1991; Alba-Ramírez, 1993. To confirm the relevance of the educational structure of labour demand, some 
authors point out that individuals characterised by a high number of job changes do not always enjoy a progressive 
reduction of overeducation (Sloane et al., 1999). 
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This paper contributes to the literature in at least three ways. Firstly, I use an extensive and 
homogeneous survey (ECHP), which provides comparable data on many European countries, to 
explore the incidence, the effects and the evolution of overeducation in five countries. As a matter 
of fact, ECHP has been designed in order to allow comparisons in space and time and it facilitates 
the interpretation of results obtained on very different socio-economic contexts. Nonetheless, 
previous analysis of overeducation based on ECHP data failed to fully exploit the potential of this 
dataset. Indeed, some authors explored the incidence and/or the wage effects of overeducation in 
various EU countries in a static framework (i.e. referring to a single wave of the survey; Di Pietro, 
2002; Budrìa and Moro-Egidio, 2007; 2009), while other authors analysed the persistence of 
overeducation over a three-year period referring to a single country (Alba-Ramírez and Blázquez, 
2003).  Secondly, I extend the analysis of the persistence of overeducation over a longer period of 
time (1995-2001) than documented in previous literature
6
. Given that the absorption of 
overeducation through career mobility can take a long time in several countries, this seems to be a 
non negligible issue. Thirdly, I do not rely the analysis on a subjective measure of overeducation, 
which is increasingly subject to criticism (Borghans and de Grip, 2000) even if largely utilised in 
economic literature. Instead, I propose a measurement of overeducation which takes into account 
an important factor of individual heterogeneity such as on-the-job experience, and I check the 
robustness of my results by relying on a more standard measure of overeducation.   
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents relevant macroeconomic data. Section 3 
contains a brief discussion of the theoretical framework of overeducation. In section 4 I focus on the 
choice of a suitable overeducation indicator. In particular, I choose to estimate overeducation 
through the “frontier of competence” model (sections 5 and 6). After estimating the incidence of 
overeducation and its consequences on wages (section 7), I apply a pseudo-panel technique to 
Eurostat data in order to analyse the destination of different cohorts of workers in the observed 
countries (section 8). 
Results show that in the Netherlands and in Spain (where the “demand-effect” seems to 
overcome the “supply-effect”) the last cohorts of entrants enjoyed a progressive reduction of 
overeducation, in spite of the entry conditions for young people in the labour market being as 
difficult in Spain as in other Mediterranean countries.  This reduction was not observed in Italy, 
Greece and Portugal.  
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 . Alba-Ramírez and Blázquez (2003) studied job-match transitions in Spain from 1995 to 1997, whilst Groot and Van 
den Brink  (2003) estimate a Multinomial Logit Model on the persistence of overeducation from 1994 to 1996 in Dutch 
labour markets. 
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2.  A quick look at relevant macroeconomic data  
The analysis of OECD data provides an overview of the evolution of individuals‟ human capital 
in the four Mediterranean countries in comparison with other European and „extra-European‟ 
countries during the last decade
7
. 
In 1996, as in 2006, P.I.G.S. countries were characterised by a very low percentage of 
individuals with at least upper secondary education in both the 25-64 and the 25-34 year old age 
groups. Nonetheless, during this decade they have been characterized by a very strong increase in 
the percentage of 25-34 year olds attaining an upper secondary degree. The growth of the 
percentage of young people holding a tertiary education degree was slower, with Spain being the 
exception. By contrast, the Netherlands started at a much higher level of aggregate human capital 
and its growth during the observation period was more moderate.  
As previously mentioned, in this paper I tried to establish whether the rapid evolution of young 
people‟s educational attainments in Mediterranean countries, enlightened by OECD data, is due to a 
“demand effect” or if it is simply the outcome of a “supply effect”. To this aim, in the next sections 
of this paper I perform an econometric analysis of overeducation that, taking into account the 
evolution of the employment structure by educational level in P.I.G.S. countries and in the 
Netherlands, is able to disentangle the demand effect from the supply effect. Nonetheless, “first 
symptoms” of the prevalence of the supply effect in some Mediterranean countries can be read in 
the macroeconomic data reported in table 1. 
Some authors point out that EU Member States have adopted different work organization models 
that are likely to require different levels of workers‟ human capital. In particular, on the basis of 
2000 data from the third wave of the European Working Conditions Survey, Lorenz and Valeyre 
(2003) propose a typology of four forms of work organization in Europe (see table 1), which are 
labelled as: (1) learning, (2) lean, (3) Taylorist, (4) traditional.  “Advanced organizations” (or “high-
performance” organizations) can be loosely identified with the “learning” and “lean” forms. These 
organization forms are characterized by a good level of autonomy, task complexity, learning and 
problem solving, and by a certain degree of teamwork and job rotation. By contrast, Taylorist and 
traditional forms of organization are associated with high levels of task monotony and tend to 
require a less educated workforce than advanced organizations. In this framework, table 1 shows 
that in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain the percentage of employees in “advanced” forms of 
organization is the lowest in the EU-15, far from the EU-15 average level (67.3%), whereas the 
percentage of employees in Taylorist and traditional organization forms is greater in these countries 
than in the EU-15 average (respectively: 13.6% and 19.1%). Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that 
Spain is characterised by a far higher percentage of employees in “lean production” organizations 
                                                 
7
 . Compare OECD, 1998, p. 44 and OECD 2008, pp. 43-44. 
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than other Mediterranean countries. By contrast, in the Netherlands advanced forms of 
organizations are more than 81%, whereas traditional forms represent only 13.5%.  
As outlined above, the difficulty in integrating young people in the labour market could worsen 
their risks of overeducation. In this regard different sources of data depict difficult employment 
situations for young people in the four Mediterranean countries. In particular, Eurostat data
8
 show 
that, between 2000 and 2005, youth unemployment rates in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal were 
nearly the highest in Europe, even if Spain had a clear reduction during the same period. Moreover, 
the gender gap in youth unemployment rates in Mediterranean countries was nearly the highest in 
Europe in 2000 and it further worsened in 2005. Even with regard to this aspect, Dutch labour 
markets differ greatly from Mediterranean ones.  The youth unemployment rate in the Netherlands, 
even if with a slightly increasing trend, is quite low (from half  to less than a third of those in 
P.I.G.S. countries in 2005), and the gender gap, nearly the lowest in Europe, has further declined 
between 2000 and 2005.  In general, youth unemployment is higher than that of adults (2.5 times in 
the EU-27 average). Nevertheless, the ratio of youth-to-adult unemployment rate is far above the 
European average in all Mediterranean countries, especially in Italy and in Greece. 
Another important indicator for evaluating youth conditions in the labour market was provided in 
a recent paper by Quintini et al. (2007) which estimated the average duration (in months) of the 
transition from school to work in a number of European countries
9
, by identifying the time spent to 
find any job and the time spent to find a permanent job. These authors note that Italian, Greek, 
Portuguese and Spanish young workers are those who spent (in 1994-2000) the longest amount of 
time finding a permanent job after leaving full time education in Europe. Even by utilising more 
recent LFS data on school-to-work transitions
10
, the situation does not show a radical change (see 
Employment in Europe, 2007, chart 28). On average, almost two-thirds of the youth completing 
their education in the EU get a job one year after leaving school, but the school-to-work transition 
seems to work better in some countries than others. In the Netherlands more than 80% of young 
people get a job one year after leaving the educational system, while in Spain this quota is a little bit 
above 50% and in Greece and Italy less than 50% of young non-students are employed a year after 
leaving permanent education. The situation in Portugal seems to be more or less aligned with the 
EU average.  
In conclusion, the macroeconomic data analysed in this section show faster growth in the 
aggregate human capital of the youngest cohorts of workers in Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece 
than in the Netherlands, even if Taylorist and traditional forms of organization are still widely 
                                                 
8
 . See Web Site Eurostat, 2000-2005. 
9
 . For a complete list of school-to-work-transition indicators, see O‟Higgings, 2008. 
10
 . LFS Eurostat data allow calculating the labour market status of young people one year after leaving school. 
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diffused in Mediterranean countries, with the partial exception of Spain where “lean productions” 
reached a considerable spread. This could mean that in some Mediterranean countries employers 
might have been unable to quickly modify production technologies and organization forms in 
response to a significant and rapid rise in the numbers of highly educated individuals. Thus, the 
growth of educational attainments of the population might have been driven by “supply effects” 
more than “demand effects” and might have generated risks of overeducation for young workers. 
Moreover, in P.I.G.S. countries young people experienced a long and difficult school-to-work 
transition which might have forced some of them to accept badly-matched jobs, worsening the risks 
of youth overeducation. 
By contrast, the Netherlands has been characterised by a slower recent growth of aggregate 
human capital, along with a high share of “advanced organizations”, a faster school-to-work 
transition and easier integration of young people in labour markets (and in society), thanks to, 
among other things, a widespread system of flexicurity
11
. Thus, Dutch labour markets seem to be on 
track in reducing young workers‟ risks of (permanent) overeducation. 
 
3. Overeducation: theoretical frameworks   
Overeducation describes the extent to which an individual possesses a level of education in 
excess of that which is required for his/her particular job. In this case an individual can be defined 
as being overeducated if his/her educational level exceeds the minimal required education to do 
his/her job. Main educational economics theoretical frameworks provide different explanations 
about the nature, existence and returns to overeducation. 
The standard neo-classical approach (Becker, 1964) to educational participation predicts that 
(adult and young) workers could be overeducated only in the short run
12
, whilst firms adjust their 
production processes in response to any changes in the relative supply of skilled labour
13
, or, 
alternatively, as long as it takes senior workers to find a more appropriate job match and as long as 
it takes younger workers to adjust their decisions about participation in education.  
Some authors argue that persistent overeducation could be consistent with Human Capital 
Theory (HCT) when work-based human capital investments and/or workers‟ skill heterogeneity are 
taken into account
14
. According to these authors, HCT does not reject the hypothesis that two 
individuals holding different levels of formal education and experience/training on the job could be 
                                                 
11
 . See Ghignoni and Pappadà, 2009. 
12
 . As a matter of fact, some studies suggest that overeducation tends to be persistent in nature (Dolton and Vignoles, 
2000). 
13
 . According to Human Capital Theory earnings equate workers‟ marginal productivity and should be independent 
from job characteristics, that is, the returns to surplus and required education should be equal. 
14
 . Chevalier, 2003; McGuinness, 2003. 
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equivalent when performing the same tasks
15
. In particular, labour demand can consider a minimum 
level of formal education and/or work experience an essential precondition to carry out a particular 
kind of work, but these two types of education can be considered substitutes in the competencies 
production function
16
, with a higher or lower degree of substitutability
17
. In this case, individuals 
with more schooling may be compensating for a lack of work-related human capital (i.e. experience 
or on-the-job training)
18, and the apparent lower earnings of these “falsely-overeducated” (and 
probably young) individuals may be attributable to an omitted variable problem, i.e., the lack of 
controls for less formal measures of human capital accumulation
19
. 
The “explicit” component of individual competencies is also important in screening/signalling 
theories. In this theoretical framework
20
 school education would not directly determine the 
competence/productivity level of workers, and the education degree would be a simple signal to 
predict individuals‟ future productivity21. Therefore, schooling would not provide a set of 
knowledge directly utilizable in the labour market, but it would screen out potentially more 
productive individuals and highlight a series of “virtual productivities”, that would take shape on 
entry to a certain job and in the function of the type of job taken (Thurow, 1974, 1975).  
Credentialist theories and Thurow‟s Job Competition Model (Thurow, 1975) are then inclined to 
hypothesise a complementary relationship between the degree of education and work experience.  If 
the level of education held by the worker is only a “signal” of his/her future and virtual 
productivity, enclosed therein his/her aptitude to be further trained on the job, it will be up to the 
firm (that hires a worker on the basis of the “signal”) to complete the education through on-the-job 
training, lifelong learning or learning by doing
22
. 
Thurow‟s Job Competition Model is entirely consistent with young and adult workers‟ (long-
term) overeducation. On the one hand, in fact, firms‟ requirements are fixed according to their 
production techniques
23
, and firms are not able to adapt technology quickly (or at all) to relative 
skills supply. On the other hand, when the number of educated individuals in the economy 
                                                 
15
 . The idea of “duality” of human capital, composed by “implicit” education and “explicit” education, relates to 
Becker (1964). 
16
 . See contra, Duncan and Hoffman, 1981. The authors found evidence to suggest that general labour market 
experience is not treated by employers as a substitute for formal education. 
17
 . In this context, an individual who is not overeducated at the moment of his/her entry in the labour market, because 
in spite of a very high degree of education he/she is lacking in on the job experience, he/she can become overeducated 
in the future, the higher his/her specific experience becomes(section 5). 
18
 . There is evidence to suggest that over (formally) educated workers tend to have lower amounts of informal human 
capital and vice-versa (Sloane et al., 1999; Sicherman, 1991). 
19
 . Alba-Ramírez, 1993, reports a lower return to surplus education even after controlling for on-the-job training. 
20
 . See Logossah, 1994, pp. 24-25. 
21
 . Empirically, individual  performances in the educational system would be a good indicator of future performances 
in the productive system. 
22
.  The term learning by doing is attributable to Arrow, 1962. 
23
 . “The marginal product resides in the job rather than in the individual characteristics” (McGunness, 2003), and 
worker‟s wage is pre-determinated by the characteristics of the job, that is the returns to surplus education should be 
zero. 
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increases, participating in education becomes more and more necessary to protect one‟s own place 
in the queue. 
A third theoretical stream, the „Job Assignment‟ literature (Sattinger, 1993), represents a middle 
ground between the two preceding interpretations and states that when heterogeneous workers are 
assigned to heterogeneous jobs, neither human capital nor job characteristics alone can sufficiently 
explain all the variations in earnings. Indeed the job allocation process is not a “lottery” and 
workers found in a particular job are not randomly distributed, but are allocated on the basis of their 
income maximization choices. (Permanent) overeducation is entirely consistent with Job 
Assignment models and there is no reason to expect that wages should be independent of job 
characteristics (as in Human Capital Theory) or of workers‟ characteristics (as in Job Competition 
models)
24
. 
 
4. Measuring overeducation 
Empirical literature suggests various alternative measures of overeducation, the most common of 
which are: (1) the objective measure (Rumberger 1987); (2) the subjective measure (Duncan and 
Hoffman 1981, Hartog and Oosterbeek 1988); (3) the empirical measure (Verdugo and Verdugo 
1988; Kiker et al. 1997); and (4) The income ratio measure (Jensen, 2003). 
Unfortunately, these methods can lead to different results for the same individual and can be 
criticised on a number of grounds
25
. In particular, each of these approaches does not take individual 
heterogeneity into account and assumes that individuals acquiring the same years of education (or 
possessing similar credentials) will have broadly similar skills. By not allowing for heterogeneity 
across the skill sets of individuals with similar educational backgrounds, these measurement 
approaches may be providing inaccurate readings of the incidence and labour market effects of 
overeducation.      
To some extent, the unobserved heterogeneity is related to the distribution of different skills 
among individuals with similar levels of education. In other aspects it refers to individuals‟ ability 
levels
26
 or to cohort-related effects resulting from a “grade drift” (Green et al., 2002), that is from a 
drop in educational standards implying that the level of human capital accumulation associated with 
various credential has fallen over time
27
. Some studies attempted to control for heterogeneous skills 
effects by using models that allow for some variability in workers‟ characteristics. In particular, 
                                                 
24
 . In this context, marginal product and earnings will depend on both the individual‟s and the job‟s characteristics. 
25
 . See Mason, 1996; Kiker et al., 1997; Green et al., 1999;  Borghans and de Grip, 2000;  Mendes de Oliveira et al., 
2000; Büchel, 2001; Jensen, 2003. 
26
 . In this case the availability of data regarding school marks might reduce the problem. 
27
. Most of the literature agrees that a grade drift happened after the recent “3+2” University reform in Italy (see Bratti 
et al., 2007). In this case a young worker possessing a high degree of education with respect to the education level 
needed to do his/her job would not necessarily be overeducated. With regard to the hypothesis that overeducation would 
compensate for a “bad” quality of education, see Verhaest and Omey, 2004(a); Ordine and Rose, 2009. 
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they control for unobserved effects (Bauer, 2002; Chevalier, 2003; Frenette, 2004), or introduce 
into the analysis some explicit measures of skills related to job performance (Mc Guinnes, 2003)
28
.  
Economic literature recognizes on-the-job experience and/or on-the-job training as very 
important factors of individual heterogeneity. Indeed, the skills of workers with the same degree of 
education could be very dissimilar depending on their different specific experience and/or the 
different training to which they were exposed. Unfortunately, internationally comparable data on 
quality and quantity of training are quite lacking. On the contrary, data on specific experience are 
easily available and we can take advantage of it. In particular, some empirical work (Espinasse, 
1997, 2000; Ghignoni, 2001) proposed a method of measuring overeducation that, starting from the 
idea of “frontier of competencies” by occupation, links the concept of overeducation to a minimum 
level of education required for entering into a particular occupation which should be lower, the 
higher the workers‟ experience29.  
These authors hypothesize that when firms hire a worker, they buy a combination of “education 
degree/on-the-job experience” from which they evaluate immediate workers‟ competencies and 
anticipate their future productivity. This type of analysis starts from the observation of the 
coexistence of individuals with very different levels of work experience and formal education in 
most occupations. In particular, the analysis of the employment structure by occupation, education 
degree and “potential experience”, in various European countries, reveals that among the 
individuals employed in the same occupation there are both young workers with high level of 
education and a poor level of work experience, and older workers with a lower level of education 
and a higher level of work experience (see Frey, Ghignoni and Livraghi, 1998)
30
. 
If we admit that all (or most of) the individuals employed in a given occupation have the 
necessary competencies to carry out the related tasks, the different educational levels found in the 
same occupation highlight a variety of access modalities to a specific job/occupation. In short, 
access to a certain occupation could occur, in principle, at any moment of an individual‟s working 
life, on the condition that he/she possesses a minimum level of competencies, in function (at least) 
of his/her education degree and of his/her work experience. In this case, it is possible to draw and to 
estimate, for each occupation, an indifference curve on the plane “years of education/years of 
experience” characterised by a negative slope, illustrating the substitutability relation (at a 
macroeconomic level) between these two basic elements of competences (see graph 1). 
                                                 
28
 . The author utilised an explicit self-assessed subjective measure of skill based on the individual‟s average 
competency across 16 areas (word-processing; spreadsheets; data management; knowledge of ITC packages; Internet 
use; corporate finance; product/process management; quality assurance; customer awareness; HRM; corporate statutory 
requirements; interpersonal skills; leadership skills; organisational skills; team building).  
29
 . In this way, HCT is consistent with the existence/persistency of overeducation  (see section 3). 
30
 . These authors utilised the age of the individual as a proxy of working experience. Occupations are those included in 
ISCO ‟88 classification. 
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Defining, estimating and following the time evolution of the minimum number of years of 
education required for a particular occupation, as well as the evolution of the number of years of 
over/under-education in the labour market, is useful in order to clarify the different empirical size of 
the “supply effect” in relation to the “demand effect”. 
 Concerning this issue, useful information could also derive from the estimation of the economic 
returns to overeducation (and undereducation). Indeed, beginning from the estimation of the 
“frontiers” it is possible  to evaluate both the returns to the minimum required years of education 
and to surplus/deficit years of education for each occupation (Rumberger, 1987). In this case, if we 
observe at the same time an increase of the minimum required years of education and an increase of 
the returns of minimum required education, it means that labour demand has required for more 
educated workers, so it has been willing to pay them better. 
 
5. The “frontiers of competencies” theoretical model 
The idea of “frontier of competencies” by occupation refers to a study of Espinasse and Vincens 
(1996, 1997) that, criticizing human capital and signalling theories, hypothesizes that both formal 
education and work experience are fundamental (and substitutional) components of individuals‟ 
competences in the labour market. In particular, they hypothesize that to carry on a certain 
occupation some competences are needed and that such competences are made up by two 
components: work experience (a) and education degree (d). If we admit the existence, for each 
occupation p, of a competences‟ function as follows: 
  daC p ,        such as:      0 aC p     and    0 dC p  
we have to admit the existence of a minimum level  daC p ,
* , that is the lower limit of the 
acceptable competences to enter into occupation p.  If we admit that experience and education 
degree are substitutes, the result is: 
0
**





d
C
a
C pp
 
and there exists an indifference curve between years of education and years of work experience (or 
iso-competence curve) like that drawn in graph 1. 
 In this case p , defined as the whole set of pairs  da,  such as: 
   daCdaC pp ,,
*  
is the domain of the competences exploitable for occupation p. It follows that j
th
 individual can 
enter into occupation p if he/she has a level of “competence”  daC , , such as to satisfy the limit 
function described by the indifference curve. Moreover, it is possible to hypothesize that all the 
11 
 
individuals situated inside the domain p  are equivalent among them from the labour demand 
point of view. From the latter hypothesis it should follow that wage is the same for all individuals 
employed in occupation p, regardless of the real level of individual competences. 
 In this context, overeducation is defined in a non independent way from the level of workers‟ 
experience. In graph 2 individuals A, B and C acquired the same number of years of formal 
education but, bearing in mind their level of work experience, we can assert that individual A 
received exactly the minimum level of education required to enter the generic occupation p, while 
individual B and individual C are, to different degrees, overeducated. In particular, individual C, 
having more work experience than individual B, is characterized by a higher level of overeducation 
than individual B. 
 
The “frontiers of competencies” econometric model 
 As said in preceding sections, it is possible to estimate on individual data a “frontier of 
competences” on the plane years of education/years of experience for a given occupation, by 
utilising the production stochastic frontier (or as in this case, the cost stochastic frontier) 
econometric technique (Aigner, Lovell, Schmidt, 1977). 
 It is worth recalling that this technique consists in estimating an isoquant, in this case an iso-
competences curve, i.e., a frontier function that gives the minimum quantity of two inputs (years of 
schooling and work experience) at which it is possible to produce some level of output (the level of 
competences required for occupation p). The amount by which an individual with a given level of 
work experience exceeds the isoquant of his/her occupation can be regarded as a measure of 
overeducation
31
. 
The econometric estimation of an isoquant is obtained by introducing in the regression an 
asymmetrical composite residual error, resulting from the sum between the normal “centred” 
residual and a semi-normal, or an exponential, always positive residual
32
. In this way the 
interpolation of the points cloud is biased downwards, so that most of the points will lie above the 
estimated curve. Thus, the estimated isoquant must be pushed downwards in order to highlight 
those individuals possessing a higher degree of education than other individuals employed in the 
same occupation, and characterised by the same amount of work experience (compare individual B 
to D and individual C to E in graph 2).   
This empirical method tends to generate higher rates of overeducation than traditional modal-
based or mean-based empirical measures. This does not mean, however, that it necessarily leads to 
an overestimation of the incidence of overeducation, because it reflects a different definition. A 
                                                 
31
 . See Espinasse, 1997, 2000; Tahar 2000. 
32
 . See Farrel, 1957; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003. 
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comparison between the frontier model and traditional empirical measures of overeducation is 
drawn in graph 3. If we use a modal or a mean-based measure of overeducation, both individual A 
and individual B can be considered well-matched, apart from their very different work experience. 
By contrast, the frontier model considers individual B as overeducated because of his/her higher 
level of work experience. 
In any case, empirical measures of overeducation have also been criticized because of the 
possibility of bias. Indeed, if a particular occupation contains a high proportion of overeducated 
(undereducated) workers, this will raise (reduce) the occupational average/mode and the 
corresponding cut-off point, thus underestimating (overestimating) the true level of overeducation
33
.  
In addition, some a priori restrictions on the number of overeducated individuals are required by 
both traditional empirical methods and the frontier method. For instance, the mode is (by definition) 
the value that occurs the most frequently in a data set or a probability distribution. In this case a 
worker is considered well-matched/overeducated/undereducated if his/her education level is equal 
to/higher than/lower than the modal level of his/her occupation
34
. Thus, we are imposing the 
restriction that most individuals are perfectly well-matched, without taking into account their level 
of work experience. Furthermore, if we use a mean-based measure of overeducation we impose that 
68.2% individuals are well-matched (assuming a normal distribution), apart from their work 
experience.  By contrast, the frontier model states that most individuals employed in a given 
occupation p possess at least the minimum competences needed for occupation p and that 
undereducated workers are a minority group. This is in line with the hypothesis that firms are prone 
to hiring overeducated individuals, in particular when the returns to overeducation are low, while 
they are reluctant to hire undereducated workers. 
 To empirically take account of the approximately hyperbolic form of the frontiers, consistent 
with the hypothesis of a decreasing marginal rate of substitution between years of education and 
years of experience, I estimated a linear model in which the dependent variable is the inverse of the 
years of education (INVEDU) and the independent variables are individual experience (EXP), 
gender (FEM)
35
, the occupation dummies Pi and the cross dummies‟ occupation/experience Ii, 
defined as follows: 
Pi = 
i  occupation  the for  
otherwise  0
1
                          Ii = 
i   occupation  the for  EXP
otherwise  0
 
 In this way I could estimate the frontiers of competences of a set of occupations drawn from the 
European Community Households Panel data (1995-2001) by the following equation: 
                                                 
33
 . Moreover the assumption of symmetry that the standard deviation method implies seems unrealistic and the choice 
of cut-off point is always arbitrary. 
34
 . See, recently, Pagani and Dell‟Aringa, 2009. 
35
 . I introduce a “female dummy” to take into account that female workers could have spent some years out of the 
labour market for maternity reasons. 
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where:   2,0 uNu      and: 
 2
2
1 ,0 vNv           or, in alternative,             expv  
 Individual experience is approximated (in turn) by the age of the individual (Age), the age of the 
individual minus his/her number of years of education (Theor_exp)
36, the individual‟s generic 
experience in the labour market (Gen_exp) and the individual‟s specific experience in the current 
job (Spec_exp). This choice is justified because information on workers‟ actual labour market 
exposure (i.e. general and specific experience) is characterised by a certain number of missing 
values (for details and definitions, see Appendix 3), and I preferred controlling the estimation by 
using experience proxies, such as age or potential experience, as well. 
After shedding light on the existence of the frontiers of competences by occupation, it is possible 
to decompose the initial education (EDU), i.e., the years of education observed for each individual 
in the sample, into two parts: 
1. EF, corresponding to the level of education lying on the frontier function, i.e., the minimum 
number of years of education required to enter a certain occupation (given individual work 
experience) which depends on labour demand requirements; 
2. RE, corresponding to the overeducation (or undereducation) level for individual jth, which 
depends on autonomous choices of labour supply with regard to human capital investments. 
Obviously,  REMaxREP ,0  is the measure of overeducation, whereas  0,min REREN   is the 
measure of undereducation. 
Given this subdivision of individuals‟ years of education it is possible to estimate the return to 
education function as follows: 
  i
i
i PcRENREPEFEXPEXPXw 


8
1
654
2
321log             [2.a] 
where w are the hourly wages,  X is a vector of personal and job/firm-specific characteristics 
(gender, age, age squared,  part time, type of contract, firm-size and branch of economic activity) 
correlated with earnings, EXP are different definitions of work experience
37
, iP  is a set of dummies 
for occupation, EF is “required schooling”, REP is “years of surplus schooling” above the required 
level (overeducation) and REN is “years of deficit schooling” below the required level 
                                                 
36
 . Approximating work experience with age minus the number of years of education, minus the six pre-scholar years, 
common to all individuals, does not change results significantly. 
37
 . Different proxies for work experience have been introduced in the estimates both in linear form and in quadratic 
form. In the latter case I would expect a negative sign, reflecting the usual concavity of the wage profile during the life 
cycle. 
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(undereducation). Estimated coefficients for variables EF, REP and REN allow evaluating, 
respectively, the returns to minimum required schooling, the returns to overeducation and the 
returns to undereducation. 
 Results of regression [2.a] could be compared to those deriving from the estimation of a 
simplified version of the Mincer wage equation (Mincer, 1974), that, taking into consideration only 
the total years of education of each individual, I can write as follows: 
  i
i
i PcEDUEXPEXPXw 


8
1
4
2
321log                          [2.b]  
This empirical analysis could be affected by two main problems.  
First of all, some unobservable individual characteristics affecting the probability of being 
overeducated are also likely to have an impact on earnings (typically: individual ability). The most 
common way to handle this problem is to include in vector X some indicators of individual 
educational paths (such as “school grades” or “obtaining degrees on time”) as proxies for individual 
“schooling” ability38. Indeed, researchers have traditionally focused on cognitive skills (measured 
by standardized test scores and aptitude tests) as the primary example of skills influencing labour 
market outcomes. Nonetheless, some authors point out that non-cognitive skills (such as sociability) 
strongly affect wages (Heckman et al., 2006)
39
.  At the same time, overeducation is associated with 
a range of personal circumstances including individuals “social network” (Baum et al., 2007). The 
ECHP survey does not contain detailed information on individual‟s academic ability, but it 
comprises abundant information on individual‟s social skills. These can defined as abilities to set 
and maintain a wide network of social relations (see Appendix 3 for details). In this case I can 
include in vector X some indicators of social abilities, which at least partially, allow controlling for 
unobservable individual heterogeneity.   
 In the second place, both equation 2.a and 2.b may suffer from a sample selection problem
40
, as 
wages are observable only if the individual actually works. To account for the potential selectivity 
bias due to endogenous labour force participation I employ the Heckman two-step procedure to 
estimate the wage functions. This procedure implies including in the wage equation the inverse 
Mills ratio derived from the estimation of the employment probability function. It also requires at 
least one variable that does not affect wages but affects the probability of being employed to be 
incorporated in the selection equation.   
 Some papers, which are focused on cohorts of recent graduates, use the presence of children to 
identify female labour force participation (Dolton and Vignoles, 2003). Similar papers on Italian 
                                                 
38
 . See Ghignoni, 2009. 
39. Following these authors, “sociability” is also strongly related with schooling abilities and grades. 
40
 . See Ordine and Rose, 2009; Büchel and Van Ham, 2003; Di Pietro and Cutillo, 2006a. 
15 
 
graduates assert that the presence of children is also likely to (positively) influence male labour 
force participation, given the greater financial responsibility usually borne by men within Italian 
households (Di Pietro and Cutillo, 2006a). Since the presence of children negatively affects 
women's participation in the labour market whereas it provides incentive for men‟s participation, 
this variable is a suitable selection variable when the analysis is disaggregated by gender. 
Nevertheless, my analysis is carried out on a sample including males and females together and I 
need a variable able to influence labour participation in the same way for both genders. In light of 
this, I use as a selection variable a dummy for single parents with at least one dependent child (see 
Appendix 3 for details).  
Being a single parent with dependent children is likely to be positively correlated with the 
probability of being employed for both women and men. One could object that (in some countries) 
the presence of welfare benefits for single mothers could discourage their participation in the labour 
market. However, between 1984 and 1996, changes in tax and transfer programs sharply increased 
the incentive for single mothers to work
41
 in some European and extra-European countries (Meyer 
and Rosenbaum, 2001). 
Furthermore, this variable, conditional on working, should not have a direct influence on labour 
market outcomes once I control for individual characteristics, working time, type of contract and 
job and firm-specific variables. The selection of the operative samples and the control variables 
play a crucial role in this analysis. Indeed, very young single parents might be (less educated and) 
less able to find a well-matched job. However, my samples include only people aged 25 or more, 
and divorced, separated and widowers are over-represented compared to teenagers‟ pregnancies.  In 
addition, single parents may be forced to spend more time with their children. In this case, they may 
find it difficult to work full-time or, in any case, they may be more involved in contract types 
characterised by higher risks of overeducation and/or low wages. For this reason, I include in the 
wage equations some controls for part time and atypical contracts.  
Formal tests on  the quality and the validity of the instrument are presented in Appendix 2. 
 
7. The results of the empirical analysis 
 The data used for the estimation of the model presented in the previous section was obtained 
from the 2
nd
 and the 8
th
 wave (1995-2001)
42
 of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP-
                                                 
41
. In order to test the influence of being a single parent on male and female labour force participation, I estimated a 
probit employment function on gender-disaggregated data, including among the regressors education level, age, age 
squared, “social relations” and a dummy for single parents with dependent children (not shown to save space). These 
estimates exhibit a significantly positive influence of being a single parent on the probability of having a job, for both 
males and females in all the five countries. 
42
. Due to a number of missing values on the “type of contract” and “part time/full time” variables  in wave 1 (1994) I  
dropped it from the sample and I started the analysis as from 1995. 
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Eurostat) for Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and the Netherlands.  This wide source of data provides 
comparable information about education and working life of a large sample of individuals in 15 EU 
countries. Unfortunately, this survey provides data only as far as 2001. Nevertheless, I believe it can 
provide some useful information about the evolution of overeducation on the threshold of the third 
millennium. 
 For the purpose of this analysis the individuals included in the sample have been selected so as to 
include employees aged between 25 to 65, that is, people between the theoretical age of exit from 
full-time education and retirement age. 
 The frontiers of competencies by occupation (equation [1]) have been estimated separately by 
year and country, with 4 alternative definitions of “experience” (see Appendix 3 for details): Age of 
the individual (Age); Age of the individual minus the number of years of his/her schooling 
education (Theor_exp); Generic experience in the labour market (Gen_exp); Specific experience in 
actual job (Spec_exp). A model including both generic and specific experience has also been 
estimated.  
The average values of the observed years of education (EDU), of the “required schooling” (EF), 
of the years of overeducation (REP) and the years of undereducation (REN) resulting from the 
estimated models are reported in table 2. In the same table the incidence of overeducation and 
undereducation by year and country is reported as a percentage (see the 3
rd
 and 6
th
 columns of table 
2)
 43
.  
 From 1995 to 2001 the “observed years of education” have increased in all countries, in 
particular in Spain. Nevertheless, in Spain and in the Netherlands the increase in educational 
attainments of the population proceeded at the same pace with a reduction of the years of 
overeducation and an increase in the “minimum required” years of schooling. These results are 
consistent with macroeconomic data reported in section 2 (and in particular with data reported in 
table 1, Appendix 1) and they should confirm the existence of a labour market capable of absorbing 
people provided with high levels of human capital. In the same period, in Portugal, Italy and 
Greece, the increase in the “observed years of education” of the population has been accompanied 
by the  growth of overeducation and by an only slight increase in the “frontier” level of education. 
In these cases, coherently with macroeconomic data, the dynamics of labour supply‟s educational 
levels do not seem to be driven by the exigencies of labour demand. 
                                                 
43
 . More traditional and not fully comparable measures of overeducation (such as modal or mean-based measures of 
overeducation) show an incidence of overeducation ranging from 27.1% for Greece in 1995 to 7.56% for the 
Netherlands in 2001. 
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The different evolution of overeducation and “required” years of schooling in the observed 
countries went with a different evolution of the returns to required and surplus schooling. The 
second-stage results of the Heckman models of  [2.a] and [2.b] wage equations are given in table 3.  
In all countries the returns to required education (EF) are higher than the returns to 
overeducation (REP). However, returns to required education scarcely increased in Portugal, Italy 
and Greece between 1995 and 2001, whereas in Spain  they have grown sharply in the same period. 
This should provide further evidence of a  prevailing “demand effect” in Spanish labour markets. 
In the first three countries in table 3 the (positive) and the (negative) returns to overeducation 
(REP) and undereducation (REN) do not appear significantly different from zero, with a partial 
exception for Greece in 1995. In that case the Thurow‟s Job Competition Model, in which 
productivity is not embodied in the individual but is entirely determined by job characteristics, is 
fully proven only for Portugal and Italy. By contrast,  in Spain (positive) returns to overeducation 
and (negative) returns to undereducation are significantly different from zero
44
. This seems to 
support the Job Assignment hypothesis, in which productivity and wages are determined by the 
quality of the match between skills supplied by the workers and skills required by the job. In any 
case, the significant incidence of overeducation/undereducation on wage seems to enlighten the 
existence of more “meritocratic” labour markets in Spain (and to a certain extent in the 
Netherlands) than in the other Mediterranean countries. 
 To investigate the robustness of my results to changes in the definition of “overeducation”, I 
replicated the Heckman estimates of equations 2.a and 2.b by using a modal-based measure of 
overeducation. In this case the “minimum required years of education” for a given individual 
correspond to the modal value of the variable “years of schooling” of his/her occupation. 
Overeducation (undereducation) is ascertained when the individual years of schooling are higher 
(lower) than the modal level for his/her occupation. Results, not shown here to save space, confirm 
the conclusions I previously drew on the basis of the definition of overeducation obtained from the 
frontier model and prove the robustness of the estimations. 
 In conclusion, the general picture emerging from the estimates indicates that the sharp increase 
in the educational attainments of labour force in Spanish labour markets should have been driven, 
for the most part, by a demand–side effect. The prevalence of the “demand effect” would be 
brought out by both the increase in the minimum required years of education (together with a 
reduction of overeducation) and the strong increase in the return of minimum required education. 
By contrast, in the other Mediterranean countries the weakness of the “demand effect”, and the 
probable prevalence of a “supply effect”, would be stressed by the increase in the educational 
attainments of the workforce, accompanied by a very slow increase in the minimum required years 
                                                 
44
. In the Netherlands only (positive) returns to overeducation are significantly different from zero.  
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of education and a slight increase in the returns to minimum required education. At the same time, 
in these countries we observe a growth of the years of overeducation and returns to overeducation 
not significantly different from zero. In this case, labour demand for more educated workers does 
not seem to increase and firms would have hired more educated workers simply because the 
average educational attainments of the population have increased during the years
45
. 
These findings are consistent with macroeconomic evidence and should confirm that Spanish 
labour markets have been more dynamic, in term of educational quality of jobs, than labour markets 
in the other Mediterranean countries and, in particular, that labour demand has been able to closely 
follow the evolution of human capital in labour supply.  
In this case, given the difficulty of young people finding work that characterised the labour 
markets of the four Mediterranean countries (see section 2), young Spanish workers are likely to run 
high risks of overeducation, as are young workers in Italy, Greece and Portugal. However, given the 
prevalence of the “demand effect”, young workers‟ overeducation in Spain should tend to be a 
transitory phenomenon. In particular, the overeducation of young Spanish workers should diminish 
more quickly than the overeducation of young workers in Italy, Greece and Portugal during 
working life. Dutch labour markets seem to be characterized by lower risks of (permanent) 
overeducation for young (and adult) workers than labour markets in Southern European countries. 
The next paragraph is dedicated to this issue. 
 
 
8. Overeducation and cohort effects: “entry condition” or persistent phenomenon? 
 In this section, in order to analyse the incidence of overeducation among young people and the 
evolution of overeducation during working life of different cohorts of workers, I used a pseudo-
panel method. 
 In principle, the ECHP is a panel survey and it allows following the evolution of working life of 
a sample of individuals. Nevertheless, evaluating the career path of individuals needs quite a long 
period of observation, while the number of individuals interviewed both in wave 2 (1995) and in 
wave 8 (2001) is very little and it risks providing no significant results. In such a case I preferred 
using a pseudo-longitudinal analysis, in which I only need two different surveys, referring to two 
different periods, to follow the trajectory of different cohorts of the population. In practise, 
individuals aged, for instance, 25 years in the second wave (1995) and those aged 31 years in the 
eighth wave (2001) collectively represent a group of individuals born during the same year 
                                                 
45
 . Note that, if labour demand for educated workers is stagnant, the growth of the educational level of  the population 
can hardly be driven by the labour demand side. 
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(1970)
46
. Obviously, this type of analysis does not allow tracing specific individuals but rather the 
aggregate destination of different cohorts of workers, which is relevant to the aim of this paper. 
 To analyse the evolution of overeducation of the different cohorts of workers, we need to 
estimate the change in the professional statuses that different subsequent cohorts of workers, with a 
hypothetically identical structure by education degree, could have reached during the period under 
analysis. In other words, we need to estimate the probability of being overeducated, at the same age, 
of subsequent cohorts of workers by controlling for educational attainments, that is, by artificially 
providing them with the same structure by education degree constant over the period.  
 To do so it is possible to estimate the probability of being overeducated in function of age, level 
of education and cohort of birth with a simple logistic regression that describes the proportion of 
overeducated (OVER) for a given educational level (EDU) i, for a given age (AGE) j, and for a 
given year of birth (COHO) k, as in the following equation
47
: 
   constCOHOAGEEDUOVERover kji 1/ln                                                                      [3] 
In this case, if after controlling for educational level and age group, the estimated coefficients for 
the cohorts groups are not significantly different from zero, the conclusion should be that each 
cohort of workers, with a given level of education and the same age, has the same probability of 
being overeducated. By contrast, if the estimated coefficients for the cohorts groups are 
significantly increasing, passing from the oldest cohort to the youngest one, the conclusion would 
be that there has been a “devaluation” of education degrees and that the risk of being overeducated 
is higher for the later cohorts who entered the labour markets.  
To deal with the problem of selection bias, I estimated the following bivariate probit model with 
sample selection
48
: 
1
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where: 
POVER = 
edovereducat  is  individual  the if  
otherwise  0
1
                         
PWORK = 
worksactually    individual  the if  
otherwise  0
1
                         
 
                                                 
46
 . See Appendix 2 for details. 
47
 . See Chauvel, 1998. 
48
 . Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981. 
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X is a vector of individual and job/firm-specific characteristics influencing the probability of 
overeducation, EDUi  are dummies for education degree, AGEGRj is a series of dummies for age 
group, COHOGRk is a series of dummies for group of years of birth and Z is a set of variables that 
influence the probability of work. 
The key element of this strategy is to select at least one variable that affects the probability of 
employment and not the overeducation risk. As explained in section 6, I hypothesize that being a 
single parent with dependent children influences the probability of being part of the labour force 
but, conditional on working, not the probability of being overeducated once I control for individual 
characteristics (age, education level), type of contract (part time, atypical contract) and job/firm-
specific variables (see Appendix 2 for formal tests). 
Results of the estimation of different versions of model [4] are found in table 4.a (overeducation 
equation) and table 4.b (employment equation). 
 Such findings show that, even if in my theoretical and econometric model the educational levels 
required from young workers for each occupation are higher than those required from older workers 
(to compensate for their lack of work experience), in every country all age groups have a 
significantly lower probability of being overeducated than the 25-30 age group (see table 4.a). 
 Actually, as previously pointed out, if overeducation were simply a transitory phenomenon (an 
“entry condition” in the labour market), destined to be reabsorbed during working life, it would not 
be a crucial problem. In this regard, some important differences among countries emerge. In 
particular, whereas 1971-1976 cohorts (aged 25-30 in 2001) have a significantly higher probability 
of being overeducated than older cohorts in all countries, 1965-1970 cohorts (aged 31-36 in 2001) 
are characterised by a significantly higher risk of overeducation than older ones in Portugal, Italy 
and Greece but not in Spain, especially after controlling for sectorial dummies. In the Netherlands 
only 1971-1976 cohorts are more overeducated than older ones, with and without controlling for 
sectorial dummies (see again table 4.a). This means that, in the Netherlands and in Spain, 1965-
1970 cohorts probably experienced overeducation at the age of 25-30 (that is, at the presumed time 
of entry in the labour markets), but they are no longer more overeducated than older cohorts in 
2001, at the age of 31-36. Econometric findings are consistent with trends in macroeconomic 
variables reported in section 2 and with results obtained in section 7. In particular, we note that 
overeducation is a transitory phenomenon in countries where the growth in the educational quality 
of jobs fits the growth of education in the labour force (Spain and the Netherlands), despite the fact 
that in Spain (as in Italy, Portugal and Greece) young workers have difficulty entering the labour 
market and finding a well-matched first job. By contrast, in Italy, Portugal and Greece, where the 
integration of young people in the labour market and the growth of the educational quality of jobs 
are lengthy, overeducation is not an entry condition but a persistent phenomenon.   
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 Moreover, whereas in Portugal, Italy and Greece, people in possession of an upper secondary or 
tertiary degree appear to be significantly more overeducated than people who reach a lower 
secondary degree (or less) even after controlling  for sectorial dummies, this does not happen either 
in Spain or in the Netherlands. That is, in Spain and in the Netherlands people with an upper 
secondary and a tertiary degree are not more likely to be overeducated than people with a lower 
degree of education if we control for branch of economic activity.  
Gender plays a role in determining individual risk of overeducation. In all Mediterranean 
countries, in contrast to the Netherlands, female workers would be more overeducated than men if I 
do not control for branch of economic activity. After controlling for economic sector the 
significance disappears, pointing out the existence of a widespread sectorial segmentation of female 
employment in these countries. 
Firms‟ characteristics and type of contract also influence the probability of overeducation. In all 
countries, excepting the Netherlands, the risk is significantly lower in medium/big firms and in the 
public sector. Besides this, it is very important to note that in Spain and in the Netherlands 
temporary employees run significantly lower risks of overeducation than their permanent 
colleagues. This remarkable difference between Italy/Greece/Portugal, on the one hand, and 
Spain/Netherlands, on the other hand, highlights a different way of using temporary employment 
that might have helped young people to reduce long term risks of overeducation in the latter 
countries. 
Table 4.b illustrates the relevance of using a selection model, since I can always reject the null 
hypothesis of independent equations. As to the sign of correlation coefficient rho, economic 
literature gets mixed results. Some authors obtain a significantly negative coefficient and justify it 
by asserting that unexplained factors positively affecting the probability of being in employment 
(ability, talent, aspirations and motivations) are correlated with decreases in overeducation risks that 
cannot be accounted for by the independent variables included in the model (Di Pietro and Cutillo, 
2006a). Others find a positive correlation and explain it with the substitutional character of 
unemployment and overeducation. In this case, for some people working in a job for which they are 
overeducated is a strategy chosen in order to avoid unemployment (Büchel and Van Ham, 2003; 
Ordine and Rose, 2011). Results reported in table 4.b show a strong positive correlation between the 
error terms of the overeducation and employment equations, confirming that, for some people, the 
difference between being employed and not being employed depends on having accepted a job for 
which they are overeducated.  
 
9. Concluding remarks 
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 Overeducation emerges when the supply of highly educated individuals grows faster than the 
relative demand. In this case, the risk of overeducation should concern the more educated young 
cohorts rather than the older ones, who entered the labour market during a period when there was a 
lower availability of high education degrees in the workforce and, other conditions being equal, a 
lower ratio between the number of highly educated workers and the number of highly-skilled jobs. 
 Risks of overeducation for young workers should worsen in those countries in which the entry of 
young people into the labour markets is difficult, both in terms of high youth unemployment rates 
and in terms of long school-to work transition periods. In this case, on the one hand, well-educated 
young people could displace less educated young people, settling for jobs not fitting their (high) 
level of education and, on the other hand, employers could easily re-categorize jobs, which were 
previously filled by workers who reached a medium level of education, as requiring a high level of 
education without adjusting relative wages. 
However, even in countries where the entry conditions for young people in the labour markets 
are difficult and lengthy, overeducation  should be a persistent phenomenon only if the growth in 
the educational attainments of the population is due to a supply-side effect, rather than a demand-
side effect. In the cases where the growth in education level of the labour force is dragged by the 
growth of the educational quality of jobs, risks of overeducation for young people should diminish 
during working life, with movement along their career paths. In this framework, some authors 
(Sloane et al., 1999) point out that a high number of job changes during working life is not 
sufficient to guarantee a progressive reduction of overeducation, unless local labour markets are 
characterised by a widespread presence of high-skilled jobs and career opportunities.  
In order to analyse this issue, I compared the incidence and the evolution (during 1995-2001) of 
young people‟s overeducation in the labour markets of four Mediterranean countries (Portugal, 
Italy, Greece and Spain), to that of the Netherlands. 
Considering that P.I.G.S. countries have been characterised by a rapid growth in educational 
attainments of young cohorts of workers and a difficult insertion of young people in the labour 
markets, whereas in the Netherlands the diffusion of high education degrees among the population 
grew slower and young people are quickly integrated in the labour market, we should expect a 
much higher risk of overeducation for young workers in the Mediterranean countries than in the 
Netherlands.  Nevertheless, international data shown in section 2 put in evidence that Taylorism and 
traditional organizations are less diffused in Spain than in other Mediterranean countries and that 
“lean productions” reached a considerable spread in Spanish labour markets compared to Italy, 
Greece and Portugal. This might be a signal that the recent increase in aggregate human capital in 
Spain might have been dragged by labour demand requirements more than in the other 
Mediterranean countries.  
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Estimation results, obtained by the competences frontiers model, are consistent with 
macroeconomic data and confirm these expectations. In 1995 Mediterranean countries were 
characterized by a higher level of overeducation than in the Netherlands. During 1995-2001 the 
average level of education of the population has grown in P.I.G.S. countries, and in particular in 
Spain, faster than in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, both in Spain and in the Netherlands the 
increase in educational attainments of the population kept pace with an increase in the minimum 
required years of education (that is, the competences frontiers of most occupations shifted upward) 
and a reduction of the years of overeducation, whereas in Portugal, Italy and Greece overeducation 
has grown. Furthermore, the estimation of returns to required and surplus education in 1995 and 
2001 brought to light a very tiny increase in the returns to required education in Portugal, Italy and 
Greece, while they grew very fast in Spain.  
Both these results (upward shifts of competences‟ frontiers and strong increase in the returns to 
required education) seem to highlight that a large part of the fast growth in the educational 
attainments of Spanish (young) population has been driven by labour demand. This would mean 
that (Dutch and) Spanish labour markets have been characterised by a strong “demand effect”, 
whereas the sharp increase in educational attainments in Italy, Portugal and Greece would be driven 
by a sheer “supply effect”. 
To test if the prevalence of the “demand effect” in Spanish labour markets has involved a 
transitoriness of overeducation for young workers in Spain, I applied a pseudo-panel technique to 
Eurostat data. This method allows tracing the “destination” of different cohorts of workers in local 
labour markets. Results showed that, even if in the competencies‟ frontiers model the education 
degrees required from young workers for acceding to each occupation is necessarily higher than 
those required from older workers, in all the five countries the 25-30 age group runs the highest risk 
of overeducation. Nevertheless, in Spain and in the Netherlands 1965-1970 cohorts experimented 
overeducation only at the time of their presumable entry into the labour markets (in 1995), and they 
are no longer more overeducated than older cohorts at the end of the period (in 2001), while they 
remain overeducated in Italy, Portugal and Greece.  
To sum up, the econometric results obtained in this paper are consistent with macroeconomic 
trends reported in section 2 and (even in the absence of  direct evidence) it can be stated that labour 
demand in the Spanish labour markets was able to absorb the fast evolution of aggregate human 
capital, and to reduce the risk of permanent overeducation for younger cohorts with successive 
movements along career paths, notwithstanding the initial difficulty of integration for young people. 
The analysis carried out in section 8 also shows a remarkable difference in the way of using 
temporary contracts, between Spain and the other Mediterranean countries, that might have helped 
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young Spanish workers to reduce risks of permanent overeducation in comparison with their 
contemporaries in Southern Europe.  
Nevertheless, Spain seems to share with other Southern European countries widespread 
overeducation and sectorial segmentation of female employment, which do not emerge in the 
Netherlands. Dutch labour markets have been characterized by more equal opportunities and lower 
risks of overeducation for all workers, apart from gender, age and year of birth. This is probably due 
to, among other things, the wide diffusion of high education degrees within the population and 
high-skilled jobs in the employment structure that they have enjoyed for a much longer period of 
time than in Mediterranean countries. 
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Appendix 1 - Figures and Tables  
 
Graph 1 – Frontier of “competencies” for a generic occupation p 
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Graph 2 – Minimum required education and overeducation for a generic occupation  p 
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Legenda: EF(B) = minimum number of years of education required to enter a generic occupation p, for the individual B; 
RE(B) =  years of overeducation in occupation p, for the individual B. 
 
Graph 3 – A comparison between the frontier model and the traditional empirical measures of 
overeducation for a generic occupation p 
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Table 1 -  National differences in organisational models (% of employees in each cluster) 
Countries 
 
 
Advanced 
form 
(1+2) 
Learning 
organization 
(1) 
Lean 
production 
(2) Taylorism 
Traditional 
organization 
Denmark 81.9 60 21.9 6.8 11.3 
Netherlands 81.2 64 17.2 5.3 13.5 
United Kingdom 75.4 34.8 40.6 10.9 13.7 
Finland 75.4 47.8 27.6 12.5 12.1 
France 71.3 38 33.3 11.1 17.7 
Sweden 71.1 52.6 18.5 7.1 21.7 
Austria 69 47.5 21.5 13.1 18 
Luxembourg 68.2 42.8 25.4 11.9 20 
EU-15 67.3 39.1 28.2 13.6 19.1 
Belgium 64 38.9 25.1 13.9 22.1 
Germany 63.9 44.3 19.6 14.3 21.9 
Ireland 61.8 24 37.8 20.7 17.6 
Spain 58.9 20.1 38.8 18.5 22.5 
Portugal 54.2 26.1 28.1 23 22.8 
Italy 53.6 30 23.6 20.9 25.4 
Greece 44.3 18.7 25.6 28 27.7 
Source: Third European Working Condition Survey (2000), quoted in Employment in Europe, 2007, p. 148, table 8 
 
 
Table 2 - Overeducation and undereducation by country, 1995-2001 
Variable  
(average values) 
Definition of 
“experience” 
utilised in the 
estimation of 
equation [1]* 
1995 
 
2001 
 
% of 
over/under 
educated Mean St.dev 
% of 
over/under 
educated Mean St.dev 
Portugal 
Actual years of education (EDU)   9.2935 3.2195  10.1133 4.0352 
Minimum required years of education 
(EF) 
Age  7.8001 0.5622  7.8212 0.9520 
Theor_exp  7.9345 1.1459  8.0635 1.6837 
Gen_exp  7.8367 0.7761  7.8491 1.0741 
Spec_exp  8.4446 0.5623  8.6578 0.7378 
Spec&gen_exp  8.7891 0.6583  8.8160 0.9725 
 
Years of overeducation    (REP) 
Age 52.56% 1.4891 2.9574 52.82% 2.3206 3.4243 
Theor_exp 52.20% 1.3981 2.6748 53.31% 2.1086 3.0317 
Gen_exp 52.38% 1.4891 2.7975 53.15% 2.2728 3.3314 
Spec_exp 52.61% 2.0467 3.5726 53.89% 2.3626 3.4988 
Spec&gen_exp 52.78% 2.0327 3.5730 53.58% 2.4069 3.4306 
 
Years of undereducation (REN) 
Age 47.44% -0.9836 0.8867 47.18% -0.6059 0.9846 
Theor_exp 47.80% -0.3128 0.5987 46.69% -0.5965 0.7581 
Gen_exp 47.62% -0.5871 0.9881 46.85% -0.5590 0.9165 
Spec_exp 47.39% -0.7728 0.9765 46.11% -0.7638 0.8769 
Spec&gen_exp 47.22% -0.4865 0.6478 46.42% -0.5641 0.9949 
Italy 
Actual years of education (EDU)   11.2234 3.8934  11.8755 3.9909 
Minimum required years of education 
(EF) 
Age  8.5845 1.4825  9.6278 1.8748 
Theor_exp  8.7389 1.7724  10.2348 2.3045 
Gen_exp  8.6002 1.5309  9.8183 2.0035 
Spec_exp  8.6935 1.5215  9.8384 1.9075 
Spec&gen_exp  8.9478 1.7005  10.8845 2.4081 
 
Years of overeducation    (REP) 
Age 51.74% 3.0973 2.9914 51.76% 3.3223 2.8363 
Theor_exp 52.23% 2.8712 2.7865 52.91% 2.9361 2.4192 
Gen_exp 53.14% 2.9989 2.9013 53.22% 3.1852 2.7059 
Spec_exp 53.68% 2.9906 2.9067 53.73% 3.5367 2.7252 
Spec&gen_exp 52.63% 2.9701 2.8138 52.71% 3.0662 2.3282 
 
Years of undereducation (REN) 
Age 48.26% -0.9988 0.9273 48.24% -0.7897 1.0209 
Theor_exp 47.77% -0.9029 0.9382 47.09% -0.9733 0.9542 
Gen_exp 46.86% -0.9989 0.9325 46.78% -0.8857 0.9946 
Spec_exp 46.32% -1.0012 0.8456 46.27% -0.7970 1.0037 
Spec&gen_exp 47.37% -0.9356 0.9106 47.29% -1.3378 1.1771 
Greece 
Actual years of education (EDU)   12.2700 4.9454  12.3521 4.6228 
Minimum required years of education 
(EF) 
Age  8.7667 2.4113  9.1108 2.1630 
Theor_exp  9.8120 2.7783  10.1931 2.7076 
Gen_exp  8.8832 2.4196  8.9744 2.1503 
Spec_exp  8.6923 2.3724  8.8719 2.0927 
Spec&gen_exp  8.7972 2.4413  9.2753 2.2506 
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Years of overeducation    (REP) 
Age 54.42% 3.6556 3.5802 54.45% 3.6959 3.2614 
Theor_exp 54.57% 3.2712 3.0083 54.58% 3.2891 2.6692 
Gen_exp 55.83% 3.6401 3.5621 56.46% 3.6748 3.2819 
Spec_exp 56.09% 3.6578 3.6679 56.69% 4.0144 3.3960 
Spec&gen_exp 55.93% 3.6481 3.5399 55.96% 3.8500 3.1656 
 
Years of undereducation (REN) 
Age 45.58% -0.8365 1.1892 45.55% -0.8754 1.0169 
Theor_exp 45.43% -0.7824 0.8500 45.42% -1.0234 0.9804 
Gen_exp 44.17% -0.8202 1.1323 43.54% -0.8712 0.9553 
Spec_exp 43.91% -1.3599 1.3245 43.31% -0.5489 1.0068 
Spec&gen_exp 44.07% -0.7891 1.1327 44.04% -0.6828 0.8490 
Spain 
Actual years of education (EDU)   11.8721 5.3025  13.0763 5.2923 
Minimum required years of education 
(EF) 
Age  8.1002 1.3215  10.4907 1.9850 
Theor_exp  8.6100 2.3451  11.3335 2.8055 
Gen_exp  8.1341 1.5894  10.5591 2.1789 
Spec_exp  8.0199 1.2222  10.4315 1.7689 
Spec&gen_exp  8.1306 1.5723  10.4997 1.9919 
 
Years of overeducation    (REP) 
Age 53.11% 3.8587 4.3259 51.01% 1.6131 4.5324 
Theor_exp 53.02% 3.3594 3.7090 50.97% 2.0677 3.5893 
Gen_exp 54.78% 3.7899 4.3456 52.01% 1.5391 4.4720 
Spec_exp 54.08% 3.9212 4.4502 53.46% 1.8203 4.6314 
Spec&gen_exp 55.69% 3.8578 4.2917 52.49% 1.7613 4.5205 
 
Years of undereducation (REN) 
Age 46.89% -0.4578 0.9202 48.99% -0.2793 0.8175 
Theor_exp 46.98% -0.7480 0.8875 49.03% -0.6653 0.8016 
Gen_exp 45.22% -0.5113 0.8302 47.99% -0.3880 0.8218 
Spec_exp 45.92% -0.7579 1.4029 46.54% -0.4587 1.0648 
Spec&gen_exp 44.31% -0.4109 0.9307 47.51% -0.3014 0.7562 
The Netherlands 
Actual years of education (EDU)   14.0612 3.7892  14.3942 1.4975 
Minimum required years of education 
(EF) 
Age  13.3304 2.1396  13.6540 0.8456 
Theor_exp  13.4297 2.4312  13.7837 0.0204 
Gen_exp  13.3371 2.2234  13.9564 0.3575 
Spec_exp  13.4791 2.1256  13.8439 0.4570 
Spec&gen_exp  13.4877 2.1661  13.9757 0.4587 
 
Years of overeducation    (REP) 
Age 50.97% 1.4999 2.0792 50.77% 0.3570 1.7153 
Theor_exp 51.88% 1.2585 1.9323 51.01% 0.4501 2.1941 
Gen_exp 50.34% 1.4013 2.0527 50.18% 0.5692 1.6953 
Spec_exp 51.69% 1.3923 2.0683 51.43% 0.5333 1.7579 
Spec&gen_exp 51.30% 1.3894 2.0548 51.21% 0.5410 1.7471 
 
Years of undereducation (REN) 
Age 49.03% -0.1502 1.9202 49.23% -0.0985 1.8867 
Theor_exp 48.12% -0.1303 1.7319 48.99% -0.0895 1.6598 
Gen_exp 49.66% -0.2699 1.9222 49.82% -0.2396 1.9258 
Spec_exp 48.31% -0.2697 1.9527 48.57% -0.2438 1.9468 
Spec&gen_exp 48.70% -0.2409 1.9696 48.79% -0.1785 1.9546 
Age= Age of the individual; Theor_exp = Age of the individual minus the number of years of his schooling education; Gen_exp = 
Generic experience on the labour market; Spec_exp = Specific experience in actual job; Spec&gen_exp: model with both general and 
specific experience.  Exponential positive residuals with density:   vevf    
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Table 3 – Returns to required, over and under education by country, 1995-2001;  
Heckman sample selection model; definition of overeducation based on “frontier model” 
Variables Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| 
 1995 2001 
Portugal 
Min. required years of education (EF)* 0.0276 2.40 0.017 0.0297 9.08 0.000 
Years of overeducation (REP)* 0.0096 0.12 0.901 0.0147 0.76 0.445 
Years of undereducation (REN)* -0.0570 -1.15 0.250 -0.0010 -0.53 0.595 
Mills 0.1762 2.65 0.008 0.1924 3.91 0.000 
Actual years of education** 0.0305 6.22 0.000 0.0361 18.95 0.000 
Mills 0.1899 1.96 0.050 0.2112 2.41 0.016 
Italy 
Min. required years of education (EF)* 0.0359 2.42 0.016 0.0388 3.03 0.003 
Years of overeducation (REP)* 0.0565 0.52 0.606 0.0262 0.35 0.726 
Years of undereducation (REN)* -0.0504 -1.08 0.281 -0.0181 -0.65 0.514 
Mills 0.2232  2.67 0.008 0.2134  2.38 0.018 
Actual years of education** 0.0391 7.26 0.000 0.0425 10.80 0.000 
Mills 0.1925 2.57 0.010 0.2119 2.34 0.019 
Greece 
Min. required years of education (EF)* 0.0208 3.68 0.000 0.0233 3.13 0.002 
Years of overeducation (REP)* 0.0152 1.99 0.047 0.0237 1.82 0.069 
Years of undereducation (REN)* -0.0039 -0.27 0.789 -0.0304 -0.43 0.667 
Mills 0.3312  2.55 0.011 0.3121  4.25 0.000 
Actual years of education** 0.0237 4.95 0.000 0.0253 11.89 0.000 
Mills 0.2984 2.12 0.034 0.2889 3.77 0.000 
Spain 
Min. required years of education (EF)* 0.0195 5.30 0.000 0.0594 4.21 0.000 
Years of overeducation (REP)* 0.0103 2.51 0.012 0.0118 4.50 0.000 
Years of undereducation (REN)* -0.0166 -1.63 0.102 -0.0354 -2.02 0.043 
Mills 0.1881  3.38 0.001 0.1812  2.99 0.003 
Actual years of education** 0.0143 7.52 0.000 0.0430 9.53 0.000 
Mills 0.1923 3.14 0.002 0.1716 2.25 0.025 
        The Netherlands 
Min. required years of education (EF)* 0.0162 5.99 0.000 0.0207 3.83 0.000 
Years of overeducation (REP)* 0.0089 2.27 0.023 0.0065 3.99 0.000 
Years of undereducation (REN)* -0.0006 -1.70 0.089 -0.0098 -0.90 0.368 
Mills 0.1324  2.97 0.003 0.1253  2.37 0.018 
Actual years of education** 0.0194 6.35 0.000 0.0212 5.85 0.000 
Mills 0.1302 3.33 0.001 0.1298 2.06 0.039 
 * equation [2.a]; ** equation [2.b]. Dependent variable: log of hourly wages, control variables: gender, age, age squared, generic 
experience, generic experience squared, specific experience, specific experience squared, firm size, type of contracts, part time, 
occupations, branch of economic activity and “social relations” as proxies for individual non-cognitive ability. 
“Mills” is the inverse Mills ratio from probit regression of the employment function  (control variables: gender, education level, age, 
age squared, “social relations” and a dummy for single parents with dependent children) 
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Table 4.a – Probability of overeducation 
(bivariate probit model with sample selection) by group of cohorts and country 
 
Variables Portugal Italy Greece Spain The Netherlands 
 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 
Overeducation equation 
Female 0.1321** 0.1203 0.0532** 0.0412 0.1524** 0.1246 0.1131** 0.0659 -0.1124* -0.0022 
Level of education           
Less than upp. Sec. (ref.)           
Upper secondary level 0.0659* 0.0257* 0.0824* 0.0798* 0.0723* 0.0568* 0.0324* 0.0099 0.0497* 0.0031 
Tertiary level 0.0769** 0.0298* 0.0759** 0.1001* 0.0989* 0.0390* 0.0864* 0.0399 0.0731* 0.0327 
Age group           
25-30 (ref.)           
31-36 -0.1521* -0.1321* -0.1131* -0.0541* -0.2909* -0.1499* -0.0178* -0.0119* -0.0568* -0.0523* 
37-42 -0.1629* -0.1332* -0.1922* -0.1632* -0.2768** -0.2203** -0.0543* -0.0253* -0.0611* -0.0671* 
43-48 -0.1794** -0.1424** -0.4523** -0.3923* -0.3106** -0.2786** -0.0239* -0.0229* -0.0324* -0.0313* 
49-54 -0.2367** -0.1447** -0.5002** -0.5502** -0.3341** 0.2855** -0.0269* -0.0235* -0.0338* -0.0175* 
55-60 -0.3232** -0.1539** -0.5967** -0.6024** -0.3323** -0.2579** -0.0232** -0.0283** -0.0312* -0.0199* 
61-66 -0.3417** -0.1678** -0.6223** -0.6113** -0.3391** -0.2556** -0.0213** -0.0114** -0.0218** -0.0120* 
Cohort group           
1929-1934 (ref.)           
1935-1940 0.0212 -0.0031 -0.01423 -0.0162 0.0367 0.0218 -0.0385 0.0002 0.0091 -0.0012 
1941-1946 0.0523 -0.0123 -0.0146 -0.0199 0.0911 0.0568 -0.0256 0.0134 0.0258 0.0357 
1947-1952 0.2433 0.2456 0.1089 0.1106 0.2018 0.2104 0.0297 0.0143 0.0155 0.0597 
1953-1958 0.3421 0.2578 0.1521 0.1204 0.1566 0.1459 0.0328 0.0295 0.0958 0.0756 
1959-1964 0.4009 0.3022 0.3333 0.3086 0.3016 0.2254 0.0321 0.0269 0.0249 0.0659 
1965-1970 0.5008** 0.4307* 0.4302** 0.4167** 0.3903** 0.2293** 0.0538* 0.0358 0.0264 0.0321 
1971-1976 0.6098** 0.5431** 0.5134** 0.4398** 0.4449** 0.3829** 0.1325** 0.1328** 0.0298* 0.0238* 
Firm size           
Small firm (ref. cat.)           
Medium firm -0.1091* -0.0438* -0.0432* -0.0398* -0.0916* -0.0891* -0.1303* -0.0854* -0.0322* 0.0199 
Big firm -0.2310** -0.0798** -0.1210** -0.0452** -0.0622** -0.0572** -0.0498* -0.0323* -0.1025* 0.0321 
Public sector -0.1821** -0.1921** -0.2431** -0.1603** -0.4299** -0.3002** -0.2594* -0.0821* -0.2301 -0.0523 
Permanent employment 0.0456 0.0113 0.0133 0.0210 -0.0383 -0.0318 0.0521* 0.0421* 0.0426* 0.0013* 
Part time 0.2123 0.1931 0.1456 0.1322 0.1090 0.0908 0.0011 0.0092 0.2139 0.1877 
Social relations (1) -0.0134 -0.0098 -0.0321* -0.0190 -0.0231 -0.0125 -0.0917 -0.0856 -0.0012 -0.0009 
Social relations (2) -0.0194 -0.0172 -0.0243 -0.0224 -0.0453 -0.0321 -0.0786 -0.0657 -0.0031 -0.0011 
Social relations (3) -0.0223 -0.0134 -0.0175* -0.0043 -0.0328 -0.0256 -0.0676 -0.0433 -0.0124 -0.0043 
Constant 0.6928** 0.6124** 1.3591** 0.9898** 0.8421** 0.7892** 1.6386** 1.3394** 0.7909** 0.6798** 
Dummies for branch of 
economic activity 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
N 10,189 10,181 12,921 12,911 8,932 8,925 11,059 11,043 9,530 9,519 
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Table 4.b – Probability of employment   
(selection equation) by group of cohorts and country 
 
Variables Portugal Italy Greece Spain The Netherlands 
 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 
Employment selection equation 
Female -0.2031** -0.2024** -0.2782** -0.2985** -0.2851** -0.2621** -0.1231* -0.1135* -0.0145 -0.0008 
Level of education           
Less than upp. sec. (ref.)           
Upper secondary level 0.1932* 0.1909* 0.1678* 0.1602* 0.1723* 0.1698* 0.0399* 0.0395* 0.0121 0.0012 
Tertiary level 0.1312** 0.1254** 0.1524**   0.1503* 0.1423* 0.1352* 0.0791* 0.0983* 0.0115 0.0110 
Age group           
25-30 (ref.)           
31-36 0.1538* 0.1542* 0.1325* 0.1366* 0.1421* 0.1234* 0.1529* 0.1516* 0.1022 0.1821 
37-42 0.2001** 0.2013** 0.1609** 0.1567* 0.1678* 0.1232* 0.1629* 0.1621* 0.1032* 0.1398* 
43-48 0.1922** 0.1998** 0.1637** 0.1595** 0.1324* 0.1222** 0.1601* 0.1603* 0.1194* 0.1199* 
49-54 0.1607** 0.1657** 0.1618** 0.1806** 0.1789** 0.1523** 0.1612** 0.1616** 0.1223* 0.1235* 
55-60 0.1499** 0.1413** 0.1722** 0.1721** 0.1694** 0.1697** 0.1538** 0.1541** 0.1769* 0.1762* 
61-66 -0.0659* -0.0724* -0.0324* -0.0577* -0.0694* -0.0564* -0.1356* -0.1306* -0.1228 0.1780 
Cohort group           
1929-1934 (ref.)           
1935-1940 0.0214 0.0150 0.0673 0.0256 0.0431 0.0012 0.0713 0.0638 0.0121 0.0080 
1941-1946 0.0254*  0.0108* 0.0391* 0.0217* 0.0091* 0.0083* 0.0356* 0.0215* 0.0102* 0.0061 
1947-1952 0.1591** 0.1688** 0.0098* 0.1391* 0.1722* 0.1624* 0.1521* 0.1303* 0.0691* 0.0598* 
1953-1958 0.1234** 0.1422** 0.1562** 0.1681* 0.1701* 0.1523* 0.1891* 0.1209* 0.0194* 0.0222* 
1959-1964 0.1199** 0.1014** 0.3009** 0.1822** 0.1560** 0.1568** 0.1394** 0.1308** 0.0126** 0.0131** 
1965-1970 0.1202** 0.1390** 0.2108** 0.1361** 0.1509** 0.1668** 0.0991** 0.0983** 0.0777** 0.0702** 
1971-1976 0.1821* 0.1815* 0.2432* 0.1628* 0.1692* 0.1705* 0.1722* 0.1809* 0.0621** 0.0633* 
Social relations (1) 0.0155 0.0012 0.0190* 0.0161 0.0134 0.0211 0.0617 0.0523 0.0066 0.0026 
Social relations (2) 0.0023 0.0009 0.0257 0.0143 0.0214 0.0121 0.0511 0.0444 0.0087 0.0003 
Social relations (3) 0.0223 0.0137 0.0178* 0.0059 0.0422 0.0356 0.0718 0.0512 0.0042 0.0023 
Single parents with 
dependent children 0.4122** 0.3981** 0.5226** 0.5312** 0.2531** 0.2498** 0.3912** 0.3824** 0.1231* 0.1229* 
Constant 1.9908** 1.3616** 1.5421** 1.1099** 1.7923** 1.7724** 1.1328** 1.1214** 1.0729** 1.0492** 
N 14,339 14,328 21,698 21,685 14,357 14,346 19,336 19,315 13,238 13,223 
 
Correlation coefficient (ρ) 0.5893** 0.5572** 0.4111** 0.3899** 0.5172** 0.5003** 0.3324* 0.3248* 0.1944** 0.1817** 
Wald test for independent 
equations 
Χ2(1)=25.9 
P=0.0000 
Χ2(1)=22.1 
P=0.0000 
Χ2(1)=18.6 
P=0.0000 
Χ2(1)=17.4 
P=0.0000 
Χ2(1)=23.1 
P=0.0000 
Χ2(1)=21.9 
P=0.0000 
Χ2(1)=17.5 
P=0.0000 
Χ2(1)=15.2 
P=0.0000 
Χ2(1)=7.67 
P=0.0056 
Χ2(1)=4.49 
P=0.0341 
* 5 percent significance; ** 1 percent significance. 
 
Appendix 2 – Tests on the quality and the validity of the instrument 
 
As pointed out in preceding sections, the estimation of a selection model needs at least one instrumental variable that 
affects the probability of employment and not wages/overeducation risk. In this section I test the quality and the validity 
of the instrumental variable I use in this paper (single parent with dependent children). 
Instrumental quality is ensured if there is a strong correlation between the instrument and the probability of working.  A 
statistic commonly used in order to test this condition (Bound et al., 1995) is the R
2
 of the first stage regression with the 
included instrument “partialled-out” (for an application to the analysis of overeducation, see Di Pietro and Cutillo, 
2006b).  In the employment equations used to estimate the Heckman sample selection models reported in table 3,  the 
partial R
2
 on the excluded instrument are  0.7326 (Portugal), 0.7129  (Italy), 0.7008 (Greece),  0.7025 (Spain),  0.6872 
(The Netherlands). In the employment equations used to estimate the bivariate probit models reported in table 4.a, the 
partial R
2
 on the excluded instrument are 0.7291  (Portugal),  0.7086 (Italy), 0.6991 (Greece),  0.6921 (Spain),  0.6798 
(The Netherlands). Thus, the tests indicate that the instrument is legitimate. 
Instrumental validity is ensured if the instrument can be legitimately excluded form the wage/probability of 
overeducation equation. This assumption is often checked through the Sargan test. Nevertheless, this test is valid only in 
case of over-identification (i.e. the number of valid instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables), which is 
not my case. Following the suggestion of Cutillo and Ceccarelli (2010), I checked the validity of the instrument through 
the approach of Dolton and Vignoles (2002). According to these authors, a valid instrument must be uncorrelated with 
the error term of the outcome equation, and thus it should not affect wages/probability of overeducation conditional on 
the included explanatory variables. When the residuals from the wage equations reported in table 3 were regressed on 
the instrument, I obtained R
2
= 0.0412 (Portugal), R
2
= 0.0538 (Italy), R
2
= 0.0397 (Greece), R
2
= 0.0219 (Spain), R
2
= 
0.0185 (The Netherlands). When the residuals from the overeducation equations reported in table 4.a were regressed on 
the instrument, I obtained R
2
= 0.0010 (Portugal), R
2
= 0.0008 (Italy), R
2
= 0.0021 (Greece), R
2
= 0.0013 (Spain), R
2
= 
0.0003 (The Netherlands). This indicates that the instrument does not explain any significant variation in the residual 
variability and hence is valid. 
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Appendix 3 – Data and variables description 
 
Data are drawn from European Community Household Panel (ECHP), Eurostat. Due to a number of missing values on 
the “type of contract” and “part time/full time” variables in wave 1 (1994), I dropped it from the analysis and I used 
wave 2 (1995) and wave 8 (2001). I selected all the employees, that is, all the individuals for which the answer to 
question PE003 in the ECHP questionnaire (ILO main activity status at the time of interview) is equal to 1 (normally 
working: working 15+ hours / week) or equal to 2 (currently working: working less than 15 hours / week); aged 
between 25 and 65. 
g  schoolinof  years
INVEDU
1
 ; “years of schooling” refer to question PT022 (Highest level of general or higher 
education completed); 
Female: dummy variable built on the basis of question PD004, (female=1; male=0); 
Age: age of the individual at the time of the survey, question PD003. 
Theoretical experience: variable built on the basis of questions PD003 and PT022 as follows: 
 schoolingof years   -     survey  the of  time  the  at  age   experience  lTheoretica  ; 
Specific Experience: variable built on the basis of question PE011 (Year of start of current job)  as follows: 
job current  of  startof year   - survey  the of year   experience  Specific  ; 
Generic experience: variable built on the basis of question PE039 (How old were you when you began your working 
life, that is, started your first job or business) as follows: 
job first at age   -     survey  the of  time  the  at  age   experience Generic  ; 
Occupation: dummies variables built on question PE006C. Occupations taken into consideration are: Legislators, 
Senior Officials and Managers; Professionals; Technicians and Associate Professionals; Clerks; Service Workers and 
Shop and Market Sales Workers; Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers; Craft and Related Trades Workers; Plant 
and Machine Operators and Assemblers; Ref category: Elementary Occupations; 
 
Tab. A1 – Frontier equations: number of observations and missing values 
 
Year and country 1995 (W2) 2001 (W8) 
 PT IT GR SP NE PT IT GR SP NE 
N 5065 7249 5119 6252 4665 5067 5679 3823 4811 4877 
Missing values:           
Age - - - - - - - - - - 
Years of schooling 2.98% 1.51% 0.01% - 0.81% - - - - - 
Specific experience 2.96% 7.51% 1.54% 4.53% 4.71% 6.57% 8.47% 7.11% 8.52% 8.05% 
Generic experience 0.81% 3.23% 1.12% 0.66% 0.07% 2.07% 4.47% 1.91% 1.91% 1.57% 
Occupation 2.51% 1.69% 1.01% 0.42% 1.21% 0.83% 2.61% 0.89% 0.58% 2.20% 
 
Log (hourly wage): variable built on the basis of question PI211M (Current wage and salary earnings, net-monthly) 
and of question PE005 (Total number of hours worked per week). 
Social relations ( 3 proxies for “non-cognitive ability”): 
1. member, dummy variable built on question PR002 (Are you a member of any club, such as a sport or 
entertainment club, a local or neighbourhood group, a party etc.?), 1=yes; 0=no; 
2. talk, dummy variable built on question PR003 (How often do you talk to any of your neighbours?), 1=on most 
days; 0=else; 
3. meet people, dummy variable built on question PR004 (How often do you meet friends or relatives not living with 
you, whether here at home or elsewhere?), 1=on most days; 0=else; 
Pover: dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is overeducated; 0 otherwise; 
Pwork: dummy built on question PE003 ((ILO main activity status at the time of interview); 1= normally working 
(working 15+ hours / week) or currently working (working less than 15 hours / week); 0 otherwise (unemployed, 
discouraged worker, economically inactive); 
Level of education: dummies variables built on the basis of question PT022 (Highest level of general or higher 
education completed); ref. cat.: less than upper secondary education; 
Firm size: dummies variables built on question PE008 (Number of regular paid employees in the local unit in current 
job), small firms (ref. cat.), from 0 to 49 employees; medium firms, from 50 to 499 employees; big firms, 500 or more 
employees; 
Public: dummy variable built on question PE009 (Current job in public or private sector?), 1= public; 0=private; 
Permanent employment: dummy variable built on question PE024 (What type of employment contract do you have in 
your main job?), permanent employment=1; fixed-term or short-term contract, casual work with no contract, some other 
working arrangement=0; 
Part time: dummy variable built on question PE005c (Main job; part time/full time), part time=1; full time=0. 
Branch of economic activity: dummies variables built on question PE007B. Ref. category: Manufacturing industries; 
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Single parent with dependent children: dummy variable built on question HD006a (Household type, economical 
typology). 
 
Tab. A2– Matches between age groups and cohorts of birth 
Age at the time of the survey 
(question PD003) 
Cohort of birth in: 
Survey 1995 Survey 2001 
25-30 1970-1965 1976-1971 (ref. cat.) 
31-36 1964-1959 1970-1965 
37-42 1958-1953 1964-1959 
43-48 1952-1947 1958-1953 
49-54 1946-1941 1952-1947 
55-60 1940-1935 1946-1941 
61-66 (ref. cat.) 1934-1929 1940-1935 
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